Making maps real

The above map shows the practical outcome of the Interim Agreement, essentially the transfer of power from the Israeli Civil Authority governing the occupied territories to the Palestinian Authority in September 1995. Cities in black denote areas of PA control over municipal affairs and internal security, constituting a non-contiguous 3 percent of the total surface area of the West Bank. The PA was granted municipal authority in some 400-odd towns and villages, denoted by the dashed-line covered areas of around 27 percent of the total surface area, while Israeli forces maintained responsibility for overall security. The shaded grey areas, 70 percent of the total surface area, remained under direct Israeli control and included settlements and their accompanying infrastructure (bypass roads, etc.), military outposts, and "closed zones," particularly along the fertile Jordan Valley, where Palestinians were prohibited from entering.

Now, pretend that the "autonomous" and semi-autonomous Palestinian areas constitute actual land, while the remaining territory is suddenly flooded, creating a Palestinian archipelago. And you get this:


































Now pretend you're a garage owner in Hebron who needs to order a part. The cheapest distributor on the archipelago, way up in Jenin, will cut you a deal at 25 shekels (NIS). The cheapest supplier in Hebron offers the part for 50 NIS, meaning a 25 NIS cut from your profits after the job is complete. So naturally, you buy from the Jenin man and hire out a boat driver to fetch it for you. Time is money, so the boat driver wants to be paid hourly wages at 3 NIS/hr. plus transportation costs, a flat 6 NIS. But wait: the routes to and fro are not controlled by Palestinians; rather Israeli gunboats patrol the waters, and thus the shipping lanes. The boat will have to dock no less than seven times before it picks up the order and another seven times on the way back. Today's trip comes out to three hours each way for the boat driver, a day's take of 24 NIS. Not bad, you saved a buck and helped a brotha with a boat out. Way to support your local economy.

Two weeks later, you get the same job at the garage, meaning you need to hire out the boatdriver to make his way to Jenin and grab the part. Only this time, the Israeli gunboats hold him up between docks on the way back, stretching his trip home out to four hours. Upon returning to Hebron, the driver asks for 27 NIS. With the cost of buying the part in Jenin, the total cost amounts to 52 NIS, 2 NIS more than you could have paid had you just walked down the street. After another two weeks, same job, same part, only this time you ask yourself, 'is it worth risking the trip if I might lose even more shekels?' So you decide to buy the part in Hebron, denying the boat driver and the parts supplier in Jenin a day's income.

And that is the fatal flaw of the Oslo process: inter-Palestinian isolation. "Bantus," to borrow from the South African apartheid literature, with no territorial continuity that revert to economic independence rather than inter-dependence for survival. Try building a viable state out of that.