Tony Karon's piece in The National, "Direct talks will fail -- is that what the US is planning on?", is clear, succinct, and poignant: really, it's about incentives!

Mr Netanyahu says he has no intention of embracing the minimum terms for a two-state solution as defined by the international consensus – an independent Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders (adjusted through equal land swaps) with East Jerusalem as its capital. It is hard to imagine why he would go to Washington and reverse himself when he’s not under any pressure at home or from the US. Indeed, it is worth remembering that the direct talks are happening not because of any progress in indirect talks, but because Mr Netanyahu demanded them.

The Israeli leader’s purpose is to engage noncommittally in the rituals of peacemaking. He will not make it easy for Mr Abbas to stay at the table, by, say, restraining Israeli construction in East Jerusalem. A peace agreement is not a goal that the Israelis value – their officials repeatedly have made clear that they believe Mr Abbas is too weak to deliver Palestinian consent for any deal. Mr Netanyahu’s priority is Iran, and he will chat with Mr Abbas as part of a quid pro quo to convince Washington to confront Tehran, not in the hope of a peace deal.

Mr Abbas, for his part, has made clear that he is going to Washington only for fear of losing US funding for his administration. In doing so, he has effectively signalled to his own people that any agreement reached in this process (unlikely as it may be) has been imposed on them. Even if Mr Abbas himself were inclined to accept whatever Mr Netanyahu offered – which, of course, he is not – he lacks the political authority to sell such a deal to the Palestinians. His term of office has expired, and the last time the Palestinian electorate was asked to vote, they preferred Hamas over his Fatah movement. Even in Fatah, Mr Abbas has minimal support for talking to Mr Netanyahu. In the interests of political survival, he’ll be looking for an early exit.

Hamas does not need to lift a finger to undermine these talks; it can be relatively confident that they will discredit themselves in the eyes of the Palestinians, as every previous round has done.

As inept as the Obama administration has been in its dealings with Mr Netanyahu, it cannot be naive enough to imagine that direct talks will produce an agreement. So, the real question is what it will do in the probable event of failure. There has also been talk of the US putting “bridging proposals” on the table if the two sides are near agreement but unable to bridge the gap. But saving the two-state solution from oblivion today could require a lot more – a readiness by the US to impose a deal based on the international consensus.

Washington has never had any compunction about making uncomfortable demands of the Palestinians, but imposing a two-state solution would require Mr Obama to take the domestic political consequences of a showdown with Israel. His record so far suggests that is unlikely.